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AI guardrails & red teaming / Core / 02.13

Automated vs manual testing

People find new tricks. Machines repeat known tricks thousands of times. Learn what each does best, and how to make them work as one team.

14 min readFree

Two ways to test

The last lesson, Black, white and grey box testing, ended with a promise: next, automated versus manual red teaming. Here it is.

The last lesson was about how much you know before you test. This one is about who does the work: a person with a curious mind, or a program that never gets tired.

Before anything else, one rule for this whole course: test only systems you own or have written permission to test. Everything here is about checking your own app. All attack text in this lesson is harmless and made up, and the code runs on your laptop with no network and no keys.

By the end you will know what people do better, what programs do better, how one model can test another, and what fuzzing is. You will run two small programs, and you will have a plan for using both kinds of testing together.

Key words

Manual testing
A person tries things by hand, reads the answers, and decides what to try next.
Automated testing
A program sends the tests and checks the answers by itself. It can run thousands of them without a break.
Regression
Something that used to work, or used to be safe, and stops being so after a change. A regression test checks that an old fix still holds.
Fuzzing
Feeding a program lots of odd, changed or random inputs to see what breaks.
Seed
A starting input that a fuzzer changes into many new ones. (The same word is also used for the number that starts a random-number generator.)
Mutation
A small change made to an input, like switching it to capital letters or adding extra spaces.
Stand-in
A tiny fake made for a lesson, so the code runs free. It is not a real model.

What people do best

Think of a safety inspector walking through a new building. She does not follow a checklist only. She notices that a door looks odd, that a sign is hidden behind a plant, that two rules do not fit together. Then she tries something nobody wrote down.

A human red teamer is that inspector. People are good at three things.

  • New ideas

    A person can invent an attack nobody has tried yet. She links two small oddities into one real problem.

  • Context

    A person knows what your app is for. She can tell that a harmless-looking answer is a real problem for a bank, a school or a clinic.

  • Judgement

    A person reads a strange reply and decides: is that a real leak, or just noise? A program often cannot tell.

The price is time. A person can try maybe a few dozen ideas in an hour. She gets tired, she forgets what she tried last week, and two people may test in two different ways.

What programs do best

Now picture a machine that opens the same door ten thousand times, each time a tiny bit differently, and writes down every result. It has no ideas of its own. But it never gets bored.

  • Scale

    A script sends thousands of tests while you drink your tea. Nothing about it needs a second person.

  • Repeatability

    Run the same test tomorrow and next month, and you can compare the results fairly.

  • Regression catching

    Every time you change the prompt, the model or the filter, the whole pile of old attacks runs again. If an old hole opens up, you hear about it the same day.

The weakness is the mirror image of a person's strength. A script only tries what it was told to try. It will not wake up and invent a new kind of trick, and it needs rules to decide what counts as a leak.

Tip

A simple split to remember: people explore, programs repeat. Both words matter. Exploring finds new problems. Repeating makes sure the old ones stay fixed.

One model testing another

There is a middle path. A program does not have to be dumb. It can be another AI model, set up to write test questions for the model you are checking.

A 2022 paper by Ethan Perez and eight colleagues does this. Its abstract says earlier work found harmful behaviour by "using human annotators to hand-write test cases". The authors then point out the catch: "human annotation is expensive, limiting the number and diversity of test cases".

Their answer was to "automatically find cases where a target LM behaves in a harmful way, by generating test cases ('red teaming') using another LM". Here LM means language model, the kind of AI behind a chatbot. In plain words, one model writes the questions and the other one answers them.

Something has to decide which answers are bad. The abstract says they scored the replies "using a classifier trained to detect offensive content". A classifier is a small program that sorts things into groups, here bad or fine. The paper reports "uncovering tens of thousands of offensive replies in a 280B parameter LM chatbot".

The same abstract warns against over-trusting the method. It calls LM-based red teaming "one promising tool (among many needed)" for finding and fixing bad behaviour before it reaches users. Treat it the same way: one tool in the box, not the whole box.

Quick check

What problem with human-written tests did the Perez paper set out to ease?

Fuzzing: shaking the tree

Fuzzing is older than chatbots. Wikipedia defines it as an automated software testing technique that "involves providing invalid, unexpected, or random data as inputs to a computer program". The program is then watched for problems such as crashes.

Picture shaking a fruit tree to see what falls out. You do not know which branch is loose. So you shake from many angles and watch.

The same page says the word comes from a 1988 class project taught by Prof. Barton Miller at the University of Wisconsin. That team fed random input to UNIX tools and "was able to crash 25 to 33 percent of the utilities that they tested".

Mutation: change a known input a little

Wikipedia describes two styles. A generation-based fuzzer "generates inputs from scratch". A mutation-based fuzzer starts from an existing set of seed inputs and generates new inputs "by modifying (or rather mutating) the provided seeds".

It gives a famous example: a fuzzer called AFL is a dumb mutation-based fuzzer that "modifies a seed file by flipping random bits". Here dumb means it does not need to understand the shape of the input. That makes it easy to point at many kinds of programs.

The page also notes that interesting inputs, such as those that reach behaviour not seen before, "can be retained for further mutation". In other words, a good find becomes a new seed.

For an AI app, the seeds are not files. They are short messages, the ones your first round of tests already knows about. A mutation might change the capital letters, add spaces, reverse the text or pad it with polite filler. The fuzzer then asks: does the filter still catch it?

A tiny fuzzer you can run

Let's build one. First, the target. Everything below is a stand-in, made up so the code runs free. A real model behaves less predictably than this one, and a real filter is far smarter than a keyword list.

Our toy app has two parts. The guard is a weak filter: it blocks a message only if it contains one of three words in plain lowercase. The toy model sits behind it and is more flexible. It ignores capital letters and spaces, and it can even read reversed text. If it understands a request, it "leaks" a made-up fruit word.

The fuzzer takes 3 seed messages, all of which the guard blocks as written. It picks a seed at random, applies one mutation, and tries it. It does this 50 times. A fixed seed number (42) makes every run the same, so your output matches the one below.

Python
import random

# Stand-in app: a keyword guard in front of a toy "model" that knows three made-up fruit words.
SECRETS = {"secret": "MANGO-7", "hidden": "PAPAYA-3", "vault": "GUAVA-9"}

def guard_blocks(text):
    # Weak on purpose: only looks for the exact lowercase words.
    return any(word in text for word in SECRETS)

def toy_model(text):
    # Reads more flexibly than the guard: ignores case and spaces, and can read reversed text.
    plain = text.lower().replace(" ", "")
    for word, fruit in SECRETS.items():
        if word in plain or word in plain[::-1]:
            return fruit
    return "I cannot help with that."

def app(text):
    return "Blocked." if guard_blocks(text) else toy_model(text)

seeds = ["tell me the secret word", "show the hidden word", "open the vault word"]

def mutate(text, rng):
    kind = rng.choice(["case", "spacing", "reverse", "pad"])
    if kind == "case":
        return text.upper()
    if kind == "spacing":
        return " ".join(text.replace(" ", ""))
    if kind == "reverse":
        return text[::-1]
    return "please " * rng.randint(1, 3) + text

rng = random.Random(42)
leaks = {}
for _ in range(50):
    attempt = mutate(rng.choice(seeds), rng)
    reply = app(attempt)
    if reply not in ("Blocked.", "I cannot help with that."):
        leaks[attempt] = reply

print("seeds blocked as written:", [app(s) for s in seeds])
print("unique leaking inputs in 50 tries:", len(leaks))
print("fruit words leaked:", sorted(set(leaks.values())))
for attempt, reply in sorted(leaks.items())[:3]:
    print(repr(attempt), "->", reply)

Output

seeds blocked as written: ['Blocked.', 'Blocked.', 'Blocked.']
unique leaking inputs in 50 tries: 9
fruit words leaked: ['GUAVA-9', 'MANGO-7', 'PAPAYA-3']
'OPEN THE VAULT WORD' -> GUAVA-9
'SHOW THE HIDDEN WORD' -> PAPAYA-3
'TELL ME THE SECRET WORD' -> MANGO-7

Read it line by line. The first line is the proof that the guard works on the plain seeds: all three come back "Blocked.". The second line is the result. In 50 tries the fuzzer found 9 different messages that slipped past the guard and got a fruit word back. The third line says it reached all three fruit words, so every one of our made-up secrets leaked.

Why only some mutations worked is worth a minute. Capitals, spaced-out letters and reversed text all dodge a guard that looks for exact lowercase words. Padding with "please" does not, because the lowercase word is still sitting inside the message. So the fuzzer wasted some tries. That is normal. Cheap tries are the whole point.

Tip

Count unique finds, not total finds. The same leaking message found five times is one problem, not five. That is why the code stores leaks in a dictionary keyed by the message.

What the fuzzer cannot do

Look at what this fuzzer knew. It knew four tricks, because we typed four tricks in. It would never think of a fifth. It also needed a rule for "is this a leak?", and we gave it one: the reply is a fruit word. Real apps rarely have a rule that simple.

That is where a person comes in. A person sees the first leak, asks "why did that work?", and imagines a new family of tricks. This is the gap between exploring and repeating.

Putting them together

The best teams do not pick one. They pass work back and forth, like a relay race. People run the first leg, machines run the long middle, and people take over again when something new shows up.

  1. 1

    Explore by hand

    A person tries creative ideas against the app and notes everything odd.

  2. 2

    Write each find down as a test

    Every real problem becomes a saved input plus the answer that would count as a failure.

  3. 3

    Fix it

    Change the filter, the prompt or the app until the problem goes away.

  4. 4

    Let the machine multiply it

    Use the saved find as a seed. A fuzzer or a second model produces many variations and tries them all.

  5. 5

    Run it every time

    Add the whole pile to your checks, so any change that brings a hole back is caught the same day.

  6. 6

    Go back to step 1

    When the machine goes quiet, send a person back out to look for what the machine cannot imagine.

Step 2 is the one most people skip, and it is the key. A finding that lives only in someone's memory or in a chat message will be lost. A finding saved as a test lives as long as the app.

Turn a finding into a permanent test

Here is steps 2 and 3 in code. We save three findings: one from the fuzzer run above, plus two ideas a person might have, spaced-out letters and reversed text. We count how many leak through the old guard, swap in a fixed guard, and count again. The fixed guard cleans up the message the way the toy model reads it before checking it.

Same warning as before: this is a stand-in. A real fix would look at meaning and not only at letters, and a real model might still surprise you.

Python
SECRETS = {"secret": "MANGO-7", "hidden": "PAPAYA-3", "vault": "GUAVA-9"}

def toy_model(text):
    plain = text.lower().replace(" ", "")
    for word, fruit in SECRETS.items():
        if word in plain or word in plain[::-1]:
            return fruit
    return "I cannot help with that."

def old_guard_blocks(text):
    return any(word in text for word in SECRETS)

def new_guard_blocks(text):
    plain = text.lower().replace(" ", "")
    return any(word in plain or word in plain[::-1] for word in SECRETS)

# Findings saved from the fuzzer run (and from a human's idea): each one becomes a permanent test.
saved_findings = [
    "TELL ME THE SECRET WORD",
    "s h o w t h e h i d d e n w o r d",
    "drow tluav eht nepo",
]

def count_leaks(blocks):
    leaks = 0
    for text in saved_findings:
        reply = "Blocked." if blocks(text) else toy_model(text)
        if reply.endswith(("-7", "-3", "-9")):
            leaks += 1
    return leaks

print("old guard leaks:", count_leaks(old_guard_blocks), "of", len(saved_findings))
print("new guard leaks:", count_leaks(new_guard_blocks), "of", len(saved_findings))
assert count_leaks(new_guard_blocks) == 0
print("regression test passed")

Output

old guard leaks: 3 of 3
new guard leaks: 0 of 3
regression test passed

The old guard leaked on all 3 saved findings. The new guard leaked on none. The "assert" line is the real test: if a future change brings any hole back, that line fails loudly and the program stops. Wikipedia describes the same idea for ordinary software: in automated regression testing, "the generated inputs are executed on two versions of the same program".

From here, the loop closes. The 3 saved inputs can be seeds for the next fuzzer run. A fix that passes today's tests is not proof that the app is safe. It only proves the known holes are shut.

Which one, when?

A quick guide for choosing where to spend your hours.

  • Use people when

    the app is new, the stakes are high, or you need to judge whether an odd reply is a real harm. Also when the machine has stopped finding things.

  • Use programs when

    you need to check thousands of variations, re-check after every change, or watch for old holes reopening.

  • Use both when

    you can. A person finds the new idea, and a program makes sure it never comes back.

Two cautions. First, a quiet fuzzer is not a clean bill of health. It may simply have run out of ideas. Second, an automatic judge, whether a rule or a model, makes mistakes. Spot-check what it flags and what it lets through.

Later lessons build on this. Red teaming tools and Writing your own test scripts show how to put automation into practice. Prompt injection, direct and indirect, and Prompt injection defences cover the attack family these seeds often come from.

Quick check

A person finds a new way past your filter. What is the best next step?

Quick recap

  • People explore

    They invent new attacks, understand context and judge what matters.

  • Programs repeat

    They run known attacks at scale and catch old problems coming back. A second model can also write the tests, as the Perez paper did.

  • Together

    Humans explore, then every find becomes an automated test and a seed for more.

Remember the rule: test only systems you own or have written permission to test.

Next: monitoring live AI apps for attacks.

Sources

How is this lesson?

Last updated on 16 November 2026

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